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United States Antidumping Laws and
Chinese Exports to the United States*
By CLYDE STOLTENBERG
B.A., University of Iowa, 1969; J.D. Harvard University, 1972; .fLA. Can-
didate, Columbia University;Assirtant Professor of Business Law/Associate,
Centerfor East Asian Studies, Universit of Kansas.
In July 1979 the United States and the People's Republic of China
signed an agreement to promote and expand trade between them.I The
two nations contemplated that they would accord each other most-fa-
vored-nation treatment.2 On February 1, 1980, the United States
granted China such status.3
Less than five months later, on June 11, 1980, the first antidump-
ing petition involving Chinese exports to the United States was filed
against China. The petition represented one of the first times China
has been a party to an administrative proceeding or litigation in the
United States since the normalization of relations in 1979.1
* The author wishes to thank N.T. Wang and Donald Cunco for their assistance in
connection with the preparation of an earlier version of this Article. The author would also
like to thank the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs for the
support afforded by a Lydia C. Roberts Fellowship during a portion of the time spent
preparing this article.
1. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-China, art. I, § 1, 31
U.S.T. 4652, T.LA.S. No. 9630. In this agreement, the United States and China undertook
"to adopt all appropriate measures to create the most favorable conditions for strengthening,
in all aspects, economic and trade.relations between the two countries so as to promote the
continuous, long-term development of trade between the two countries." Id They further
agreed to "make every effort to foster the mutual expansion of their reciprocal trade and to
contribute, each by its own means, to attaining the harmonious development of such trade."
Id art. I, § 2.
2. Id art. IL
3. The value of Chinese exports to the United States increased from S1.058 billion in
1980 (a 79% increase over the previous year) to S1.895 billion in 1981 (another 79% increase)
to $2.284 billion in 1982 (a 20% increase). Clarke, The U.S.-China Economic Relationship:
Entering the Second Decade, in U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS, 1983: Six ESSAYS 24 (D.
Bays ed., 1983).
4. Since then, other proceedings involving a variety of products such as cotton, poly-
ester, cotton shop towels, ceramic tableware, mushrooms, clothespins, and potassium per-
manganate have also been initiated. Other products including ammonium paratungstate
steel nails, jewelry, and footwear have been identified as potential subjects of future pro-
ceedings. Richards, Protectionism and the ITC, 9 THE CHINA Bus. REv. 28, 31 (1982).
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Although many other hurdles exist for the development of United
States-China trade relations, the antidumping issue may well be one of
the most significant barriers to trade in the foreseeable future. The
United States relaxation of restrictions on technology exports to China,
the new bilateral textiles agreement, and the new bilateral technologi-
cal cooperation agreement all indicate the possibility of governmental
accommodation. However, the broader strategic goals underlying
much of the two governments' activities will not dissuade a United
States company or industry from pursuing a dumping claim when it
feels it has suffered as a result of competition from low-priced imports
from China.
This Article will examine the issues involved by considering:
(1) the general framework of United States antidumping and related
laws and their procedural context; (2) the cases, decided and pending,
which have arisen between the United States and China; and (3) the
key issues which have emerged in such proceedings, the parties' ratio-
nales for selecting particular strategies, the role politics has played, and
the effect of such proceedings on United States-China trade relations.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
Five basic unfair trade and import relief actions are available
under United States international trade law:5 (1) Antidumping ac-
tions;6 (2) Escape Clause and Market Disruption actions;' (3) Counter-
vailing Duty actions;8 (4) Unfair Methods of Competition in Import
Trade actions;9 and (5) Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practice actions.10
A variety of remedies are available under these statutes, and the proce-
dural requirements vary under each. To date, most of the proceedings
involving imports from China have been either antidumping actions or
escape clause and market disruption actions.
5. Garfinkel, Guide to Import Relic/and Unfair Trade Actions Available Under United
States International Trade Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 240, 241 (1981).
6. Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 731-40, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1982).
7. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1982); see also Trade Act of 1974
§ 406(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a) (1982).
8. Tariff Act of 1930, subtit. A, tit. VII (1930) (current version at Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
9. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), amended by Trade Act of 1974
§ 341, 88 Stat. 2053-54 (1974).
10. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982), amended by Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, PUB. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 275-76 (1979).
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A. Antidumping Actions
Antidumping proceedings can be brought by any United States
company or group of companies against foreign producers and United
States importers." The basic allegation of the petition should be that
imports are being sold in the United States market at less than fair
value (LTFV).' 2
To determine whether there have been sales at LTFV, a compari-
son of "foreign market value" and the United States price is required.
Foreign market value is usually calculated on the basis of the wholesale
price, after certain adjustments' 3 are made for sales in customary quan-
tities,' 4 in the home market of the exporting country. The United
States price is defined as the purchase price or exporter's sales price. 5
If sales in the exporting country's home market are nonexistent or in-
sufficient 16 to form an adequate basis for comparison, the foreign mar-
ket value is determined either on the basis of the price at which the
merchandise is sold or offered for sale to third countries (countries
other than the United States), or on the basis of "constructed value."' 7
Constructed value is generally used for comparison when third country
and home market sales are inadequate,' 8 or when the United States
11. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-30, § 2, 93 Stat. 147, § 731 (1979)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976)).
12. Id
13. Adjustments are made to facilitate a fair comparative analysis. The Code of Federal
Regulations provides for adjustments for differences in: (1) quantities, 19 C.F.R. § 353.14
(1983); (2) circumstances of sale, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1983); (3) physical characteristics, 19
C.F.R. § 353.16 (1983); and (4) level of trade, 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 (1983). Seegenera/lb' Bar-
den,A4ntidumping---Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, in THE COMMERCE DE-
PARTMENT SPEAKS ON DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 9, 15-20 (Practicing Law
Institute, 1982).
14. "Customary quantities" are the usual wholesale quantities sold or offered for sale in
the ordinary course of trade for home consumption. Comparisons are usually made on the
basis of comparisons between comparable quantities. Barden, srupra note 13, at 16-17.
15. "Purchase price is the price to the United States when the importer is unrelated to
the exporter or, in most instances, when the merchandise is sold to an unrelated person in
the United States before it is imported." Id at 12. "The exporter's sales price is the price to
the United States when the exporter and importer are related and the merchandise is not
sold to an unrelated purchaser until after importation." Id. at 13.
16. Less than six percent of the quantity exported to countries other than the United
States.
17. "Constructed value" of imported merchandise is the sum of: (1) the cost of materi-
als and fabrication or other processing used to produce such or similar merchandise before
the date of exportation; (2) an amount for general expenses and profit; and (3) the cost of all
containers, coverings, and packaging for shipment. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982).
18. Sales may be inadequate when the quantity sold for home consumption or to third
countries is too small compared to the quantity sold as exports to the United States. Barden,
supra note 13, at 19-20.
1983]
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Department of Commerce (Commerce) has reason to believe exports
are being sold at a price less than the cost of production.' 9
Antidumping petitions are filed both with Commerce and the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC).20 The ITC first determines
whether there exists a substantial risk of injury. Commerce next deter-
mines whether there have been LTFV sales. The ITC then determines
whether there has been actual, or the threat of, material injury2 to the
petitioner. If so, the ITC determines whether the injury was caused by
dumping.
If dumping and injury are proven,22 Commerce then assesses
dumping duties representing approximately the difference between the
foreign market value and the price of the product less certain deduc-
tions in the United States. However, the foreign producers can avoid
payment of duties by raising their United States price, lowering their
home market prices, or adopting a combination of the two methods.
19. Id at 21-22.
20. The petitions are filed with Commerce and the ITC simultaneously. Tariff Act of
1930 §§ 702(b), 732(b), 19 U.S.C. §§ 167la(b), 1673a(b) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.36,
355.26(c) (1981). Under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 3 C.F.R. § 513 (1979), which
became effective on Jan. 2, 1980, Commerce inherited the responsibility for determining
countervailing and antidumping duties from the Treasury Department. See generaly Office
of Investigations, Import Administration, Department of Commerce, Processing Antldunp-
ing and Countervailing Duty Investigations, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 53 (Practicing Law Institute 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Office of Investigations].
21. Material injury is defined as harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or un-
important. Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 771(7)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). In
determining material injury by reason of LTFV imports, the ITC is directed to consider,
among other things, the volume of such imports, the effect of the imports on prices in the
importing country, and the impact of the imports on the domestic industry. Id § 771(7)(B),
19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(B) (1982). The ITC is directed to assess the effect of dumped imports in
relation to the United States production of a like product if available data permit the sepa-
rate identification of production in terms of criteria such as the production process or the
producer's profits. Id § 771(4)(D), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D) (1982). If the domestic produc-
tion of the like product has no separate identity, the ITC must examine the production of the
narrowest group or range of products containing the like product for which the necessary
identifying information is available. Id
22. These determinations are to be made on the basis of the best available information,
This always includes information obtained in previous investigations and information avail-
able in written submissions of the petitioners' and respondents' questionnaire responses. In
addition, sources of information may include annual reports of the companies under investi-
gation, foreign government publications, and data assembled anywhere within the federal
government. Governing law and regulations provide for verification of information upon
which any final determination by Commerce is based. See Office of Investigations, stra
note 20, at 85-89.
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Commerce requires only that the "dumping margins"' be eliminated
either by payment of extra duties or through price adjustments.24
One commentator suggests that the decision of whether to proceed
with an antidumping complaint should be based on three factors:'
1. Size of the dumping margins:26 Even if there is evidence of
dumping by foreign producers, the size of the margins may be
too small to make proceeding with an antidumping action worth-
while. It has been suggested that margins of five to eight percent
are too small, 27 but that such a determination should be based on
each petitioner's circumstances. Particular attention should be
paid to the distribution structure of the petitioner's business,
costs and profit margins and to the effects of competitive price
cuts on rates of return.
2. Ability to demonstrate injury: Once LTFV margins are estab-
lished, the petitioner must still prove that it has been directly af-
fected by LTFV sales.28 The standard in dumping cases is the
existence of "material injury," defined as an injury which is not
immaterial, inconsequential or unimportant.29 A finding of such
injury may be based on, but not necessarily limited to, evidence
of "price suppression or depression, lost sales, reduced produc-
tion, unemployment or underemployment of workers, or reduced
profits."30
If the petitioner industry suffers no current damage, it may
nonetheless demonstrate a threat of material injury posed by
LTFV imports. To demonstrate this threat, "additional informa-
tion regarding the capacity of foreign producers to continue their
penetration of the United States market would be required.
' 31
Even if the petitioner presents the required evidence, it still will
not prevail unless it proves that LTFV sales have been the cause
of damage or threat thereof. If other forces or the petitioner's
own actions are responsible, the case will also fail.
3. Amount of potential relief: Before initiating litigation, the peti-
tioner should give considerable thought to the range of possible
outcomes. It should weigh the possible relief against the actual
23. The "dumping margin" is the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds
United States price.
24. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 242.
25. Id at 242-43.
26. See supra note 23.
27. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 242.
28. Trade Act of 1979 § 735(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1673(d) (1982).
29. Id § 771(7), 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1976).
30. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 243.
31. Id
1983]
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cost of prosecuting the action. The potential losses in the event
action is not taken, as well as current losses, must also be ana-
lyzed.32 Potential petitioners should also analyze the foreign pro-
ducer's capacity for continuing and perhaps even intensifying its
effort to capture a greater share of the United States market in
the event that the foreign producer is not dissuaded from contin-
uing the use of present trade practices.33 By the same token, the
petitioner should also consider how the mere initiation of pro-
ceedings may affect the momentum of recent market penetration
by the foreign producer.34
B. Escape Clause and Market Disruption Actions
Proceedings under sections 201(b) and 406(a) of the Trade Act of
1974 are called "escape clause" actions because they are literally an
escape from the requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Section 201 is based on article XIX of GATT, which
focuses on the possibility that GATT-negotiated concessions might re-
sult in serious injury.3 The Senate Finance Committee described the
purpose of the "escape clause" as follows:
The rationale for the "escape clause" has been, and remains, that as
barriers to international trade are lowered, some industries and
workers inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps eco-
nomic extinction. The "escape clause" is aimed at providing tempo-
rary relief for an industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat
thereof, so that the industry will have sufficient time to adust to the
less restricted international competition. 37
Section 201(b) covers injury to domestic industry by fairly priced
imports from market economies.3 It is not necessary under section
32. Id
33. Id
34. For a more complete analysis of policy and recent developments relating to an-
tidumping law, seeAntidumping Law: Policy andlmplementation, in MICHIGAN YEAROOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES (1979); THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1982); and THE
TRADE AGREEMENT ACT OF 1979-FOUR YEARS LATER (PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
1983.)
35. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 244; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened
for signature April 12, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 1842, T.I.A.S. No. 4345, as amended by T.I.A.S. No.
9650.
36. Cunningham, Relief from Imports Under Section 201 ("The Escape Clause') and
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, in THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979-FOUR
YEARS LATER 162 (PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1983).
37. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974).
38. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 161.
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201(b) to prove that foreign competitors have actually engaged in un-
fair trade practices. 39 Rather, the petitioner simply must show that in-
creased imports are a substantial cause of "serious injury"4 to the
domestic industry.4' To accomplish this, the petitioner must prove
three elements: (1) that imports of the product in question are increas-
ing, either in actual terms or relative to domestic production; (2) that
the domestic industry has suffered, or is threatened with, serious injury;
and (3) that imports are one of the major causes of the serious injury.42
It has been pointed out that section 201(b) cases have the advantage of
covering all countries exporting to the United States while other legal
approaches are generally aimed at one company or groups of compa-
nies within a single country.4 3
The petitioner initiates a section 201(b) proceeding by filing a peti-
tion with the ITC, which then has six months to make its determina-
tion. If the ITC decides for the petitioner, it makes a recommendation
to the President of the United States for import relief or adjustment
assistance. The President then has sixty.days to accept, reject or modify
the ITC's findings and recommendations. If the President agrees that
import relief is desirable, he or she can impose quotas, tariff-rate quo-
tas, or increased import duties for up to five years,44 or the President
can require the negotiation of orderly marketing agreements with for-
eign governments a.4  The President can also order that adjustment
assistance be provided to firms or to individual workers.46 If the Presi-
dent disagrees with an ITC determination he or she can reject the ITC's
recommendations. Until recently Congress had the power to override
39. It has been suggested that "if the real problem is dumping or subsidization from a
few companies or countries, relief under the dumping or countervailing duty laws may be
more certain." Id. at 181. Moreover, because "escape clause" relief is only temporary, it is
not generally intended to change an importer's long-term behavior as is the case with an-
tidumping and countervailing duty actions. Id
40. "Serious injury" must be current and "of grave or important proportions." Bolts,
Nuts, and Screws ofIron or Steel, U.S. INr'L TRADE COMN'N [USITC] Pub. No. 747 at 11
(Nov. 1975). It must be "an important, crippling or mortal injury; one having permanent or
lasting consequences." Asparagus, USITC Pub. No. 755 (Jan. 1976).
41. See, ag., Fishing Rods and Parts Thereof, USITC Pub. No. 1194 (Nov. 1981).
42. Trade Act of 1974 § 1, 19 U.S.C. § 2251, (1982).
43. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 244.
44. Trade Act of 1974 § 203(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982).
45. Id § 202, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982). The maximum tariff increase is 50% over the
previous rate. An orderly marketing agreement essentially consists of negotiated quotas.
Examples include the voluntary Restraint Agreement of 1969 and the Trigger Price Mecha-
nism of 1978 with respect to imports of steeL
46. The Secretary of Labor can initiate adjustment assistance for 52 weeks at 70% pay,
job relocation allowances and employment assistance. Loans and guarantees to companies
may be initiated by the Secretary of Commerce.
1983]
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the Presidents's decision within ninety legislative days by a majority
vote of both houses.47 If overridden, the President had to implement
the ITC's recommendation.
Section 406(a) is similar in operation to section 201(b). Section
406(a), however, covers injury to domestic industry caused by fairly
priced imports coming from nonmarket economies.48 In order to find
market disruption, the ITC must find: (1) presence of a "like or di-
rectly competitive article" produced by the domestic petitioners; (2) ab-
solute or relative increase in imports; and (3) that these imports are a
"significant" cause of injury.49 Note that the "significant" cause of in-
jury standard under section 406(a) replaces the "substantial" cause re-
quirement of section 201(b).5 0 This difference, at least in theory,
relaxes the standard petitioner is required to meet. In addition, section
406(a) proceedings move more quickly than section 201(b) proceed-
ings. " However, the remedy is limited to import relief; no provision is
made for adjustment assistance. Given these differences between sec-
tion 201(b) actions and section 406(a) actions, a petitioner in the posi-
tion of being able to choose between the two would have to be guided
by the circumstances of its particular case.
Escape clause and market disrupfion cases "involve a substantial
political effort."' 52 Petitioner must generate support in Congress and
among key economic advisors in the administration. Petitioner must
also carefully plan public relations programs to supplement the legal
effort. All phases of this political effort require continuous coordina-
tion to ensure success. 53 Although the scope of direct political involve-
ment in section 201(b) and section 406(a) cases may exceed that found
in antidumping cases because of the President's involvement in the for-
mer, it would clearly be a mistake to discount the political ramifications
which could arise in antidumping actions.
The six ITC commissioners are political appointees.54 Although
47. Trade Act of 1974 § 203(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1982). The United States
Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 invalidated this section.
48. A premise of the law is that Communist governments can focus resources on exports
and direct those exports at specific countries which could result in a sudden flooding of the
target countries' markets. A significant purpose of the statute is to avoid overdependence on
Communist countries for vital raw materials. See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 184-85,
49. Trade Act of 1974 § 406(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982).
50. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 186.
51. The ITC investigation of a section 406 case lasts only three months; the correspond-
ing time period in section 201 cases is six months. 1d at 180, 185.
52. Garfinkel, supra note 5, at 245.
53. Id
54. See Richards, supra note 4, at 28.
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the ITC apparatus includes an investigative staff, appointment to the
post of commissioner requires no specialized training in law or eco-
nomics (although, fortunately, most of the commissioners usually do
have a background in one or both areas)."5 Moreover, proceedings
before the ITC are administrative rather than strictly judicial in nature,
with all that is implied for the role of formality, witness qualification
and evidentiary standards in such proceedings. Commentators have
discussed at some length the pros and cons of antidumping actions ver-
sus escape clause and market disruption actions. 6
II. SUMMARY OF DECISIONS AND PENDING CASES
TO DATE
A. Antidumping Actions
1. Menthol
For many decades China has been one of the world's leading men-
thol producing countries and is second only to the United States in
home market menthol consumption. China has also been a substantial
supplier to markets in Asia, Europe and the Americas. Until the late
1940s China was a significant supplier of menthol to the United States
market. From the late 1940s until late 1977, however, Chinese menthol
exports to the United States were interrupted, and they did not resume
until relations and trade between the two countries improved during
the 1970s. In the interim Brazil became the dominant supplier. How-
ever, Brazilian crop failures in 1973-1974 resulted in a sudden tempo-
rary quintupling of prices. It was also during this period that the
United States subsidiary of a German conglomerate decided to assume
a major role in the United States market by building a plant to supply
synthetic menthol.57
The return of natural menthol prices to more characteristic levels
created great pressure on the new synthetic menthol industry, leading
to the initiation of an antidumping proceeding against the Chinese in
1980. The ITC, in its preliminary determination in July 1980, held that
there was a "reasonable indication" of a threat of material injury to the
United States industry by imports of Chinese menthol at less than mar-
55. Id
56. See generally Garfinkel, supra note 5 and Cunningham, supra note 36.
57. See generally Respondents (Final) Pre-Hearing Memorandum, USITC Investiga-
tion No. 731-TA-28 (1981), Menthol from the People's Republic of China, at 1-20 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Respondent's Pre-Hearing Memorandum].
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ket value. 8 The China National Native Produce and Animal By-Prod-
uct Import and Export Corporation (CNEC), the Chinese entity
engaged in menthol exports, 59 was not even notified of the pendency of
antidumping proceedings until late June of 1980 when it was advised of
the impending proceedings by an ad hoc group of United States im-
porters. CNEC participated only nominally and without counsel in the
ITC's preliminary inquiry.6"
At the outset of its LTFV inquiry, Commerce considered the ques-
tion of whether China's economy was state-controlled to the extent that
Chinese home market menthol prices could not be used for comparison
purposes with United States menthol prices.6 ' Commerce decided that
China's economy was state-controlled and on January 14, 1981, pub-
lished its preliminary LTFV determination finding a 13.5% dumping
margin.62 Commerce immediately suspended liquidation of all entries
or withdrawals of merchandise from warehouses for consumption and
58. Goldsmith, Protectionism, THE CHINA Bus. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 19;see Respon-
dent's Pre-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 57, at 6.
59. Letter from counsel for CNEC to Miriam Bishop, Investigator, ITC (May 14, 1981):
CNEC, a national corporation organized under the laws of China, is one of ten
specialized trading corporations established by the Ministry of Foreign Trade of
the People's Republic of China. CNEC's purpose is to engage in the import and
export of a range of native produce and animal by-products including, for exam-
ple, tea, herbs, dates, walnuts, essential oils and tobacco leaves. CNEC does not
enjoy a competitive advantage in Chinese markets by reason of its status as a state
trading corporation. Rather, the corporation itself, under a civil manager/director,
negotiates purchases from producers according to market prices, supply and de-
mand. For example, CNEC, and not the Government, purchases menthol from
various unrelated menthol producers in the Chinese market and makes those
purchases to meet export commitments under agreements CNEC negotiates with
foreign buyers of Chinese menthol. Menthol producers in China are under no
obligation to sell any quantity to CNEC. CNEC's offering prices have to be com-
petitive with those of home market purchasers in order for CNEC to purchase
menthol.
Concerning the distribution and use of CNEC's revenues, CNEC uses reve-
nues from the sale of menthol and other products to cover its domestic and foreign
operating costs. A major part of these expenses includes paying for and financing
purchase of the products, such as menthol, it buys from domestic producers, and
purchasing imported goods that it sells in China. Wages and administrative costs
are other major expenditure items. Revenues are also retained for working capital.
After these expenses and working capital needs are met, CNEC's remaining reve-
nue is remitted to the Chinese government.
60. Respondent's Pre-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 57, at 5-6.
61. Notice of Postponement of Preliminary Decision, 45 Fed. Reg, 66,835 (1980); see
Tariff Act of 1930 § 733(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(c) (1982).
62. 46 Fed. Reg. 3258 (1981). It is worthwhile to note, for purposes of illustrating the
fact finding procedures employed by Commerce, that this margin was based on "one or two
telephone inquiries to a United States importer of Paraguayan menthol to determine the
foreign market value, with no time even to consider adjustments at the preliminary stage."
[Vol, 7
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required China to post a cash deposit, bond or other security in the
amount of 13.5% of the f.o.b. value of natural menthol.63 Commerce's
final LTFV determination, made after giving consideration to a
number of statutorily required adjustments," however, showed average
margins of only 2.5%.65
The final ITC decision was favorable to China.66 The ITC unani-
mously determined in June 1981 that the United States menthol indus-
try had not been materially injured or threatened with material
injury.6 7 The "no material injury" finding was based on the ITC's con-
clusions that: (1) the increase in market share enjoyed by imports from
China occurred concurrently with declines in imports from other coun-
tries; (2) there was no clear pattern of LTFV imports significantly un-
derselling domestic merchandise; (3) the declining market price for
menthol was not precipitated by imports from China; and (4) there was
no causal link between any decline suffered by the United States indus-
try and LTFV imports. 68
Cuneo & Manuel, Roadblock to Trad" The State-Controlled Eonony Issue in Antidumping
Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 277, 300 (1982).
63. 46 Fed. Reg. 3258 (1981); see Tariff Act of 1930 § 753(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)
(1982).
64. See Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 62, at 300.
65. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,614 (1981); see generally Tariff Act of 1930 § 773(a), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a) (1982). Commerce stated that there were two factors for which it had been un-
able to make adjustments due to insufficient time for analysis: (1) differences in the contract
period because the Chinese sold almost exclusively by contracts specifying future delivery
one or two years after the date of sale whereas the surrogate Paraguayans sold on a short-
term delivery basis, and (2) lack of comparability due to differences in sales volumes,
wherein Chinese sales volume per contract regularly involved volumes up to ten times those
of Paraguay and the Chinese regularly gave volume-related discounts. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,614
(1981).
66. USITC Pub. No. 1151, Investigation No. 731-TA-28 (June 1981).
67. 46 Fed. Reg. 31,796 (1981).
68. Id On the point of the alleged adverse effect of imports on the domestic injury, the
ITC found that (1) from 1977 to 1980 United States production, capacity, and commercial
shipments had increased steadily; (2) employment and wages in the industry had risen dur-
ing the same period; (3) although domestic inventories had increased from 1977 to 1979,
they had declined significantly in 1980; and (4) the decline in capacity utilization from 1978
to 1980 had been accounted for by the increase in United States capacity with the opening of
the petitioner's new plant. Although the ITC found that overall profitability of the domestic
industry had declined from 1978 to 1980, it found no causal link between the decline and the
LTFV imports; rather, it found a number of other factors responsible: (1) domestic menthol
prices had declined along with world menthol prices due to the problem of oversupply in a
commodity market in which prices are controlled by supply; (2) the decline in domestic
profitability was due in part to the fact that a majority of the petitioner's product was ex-
ported to affiliated companies and sold at prices lower than domestic prices; (3) overall prof-
itability figures were lowered as a result of losses suffered by a nonparty domestic producer
during a 6-month strike in 1980; and (4) United States producers' petroleum based raw
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On the "threat of material injury" question, the ITC found no
clear evidence that: (1) United States producers' share of the market
would be prevented from continuing to increase;69 (2) China intended
to increase its production capacity;70 or (3) inventories of Chinese men-
thol then held in bonded warehouses in the United States would pose a
threat of material injury.71 Finally, the ITC found no material retarda-
tion of the establishment of the domestic industry.72
2. Polyester/Cotton Printcloth
Greige polyester/cotton printcloth is a widely produced textile
fabric that has a variety of applications in the manufacture of apparel,
including pocketing and lining, as well as in household uses such as
material costs had been increasing when world market prices were apparently declining. Id.
at 31,798. In response to the petitioner's claim that sales had been lost to imports of menthol
from China, the ITC found a number of factors suggesting other causes for the loss of sales
and also noted that the United States producers' domestic market share had increased from
1978 to 1980. Id A point which the ITC did not go into was the'fact that the petitioner was
a new wholly-owned subsidiary of a German conglomerate. CNEC argued that it was
"aware of no case in which the antidumping laws have been interpreted as providing a
guarantee of the unwarranted expectations of a foreign conglomerate seeking nearly instant
pre-eminence in the U.S. marketplace." Respondent's Pre-Hearing Memorandum, stpra
note 57, at 4. Although there is no express statutory basis for relaxing antidumping protec-
tion afforded a United States industry because its main participant is the subsidiary of 1
foreign conglomerate, one cannot help but wonder whether this fact was kept in mind by the
Commissioners as they analyzed the situation.
69. 46 Fed. Reg. 31,798 (1981). Although imports from China had continued to in-
crease in January-March 1981, those imports appeared to be taking over a portion of the
domestic market which had traditionally been supplied by imports from other sources. The
absence of a clear pattern of underselling of LTFV imports was also regarded as relevant in
this regard. Id
70. Flooding had reduced production in 1980. Inventories had decreased as a result of
increases in both homemarket demand and exports. The United States was only China's
fourth largest export market and there was no indication that CNEC intended to direct
larger volumes of menthol to the United States. Id Indeed, it had been suggested at the
Final Hearing before the ITC on May 5, 1981 that increased production would slow, based
on the facts that (1) 1980 production had been short of necessary supply and (2) the falling
international market price would make menthol production less profitable. Hearing Tran-
script at 172, USITC Pub. No. 1151, Investigation No. 731-TA-28 (June 1981), 46 Fed, Reg.
31,798 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Transcript].
71. Some of the inventories were destined for transshipment. Some were held by end
users who typically stored menthol for long periods of time before withdrawing it for use,
An additional portion was held by dealers who had purchased it against committed fixed
price contracts. As to importers' inventories that had already cleared customs, the ITC
found it reasonable to assume that the majority had already been committed under fixed
price contracts because no new contracts had been negotiated since July 1980. ld
72. Economic data showed that the domestic industry was a viable competitor in the
marketplace. It had gained a consistently increasing and substantial share of apparent do-
mestic consumption. Levels of production, capacity and employment had all increased, Id
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curtains, bedspreads and quilts. After China obtained most-favored-
nation status in 1980, United States imports of Chinese printcloth in-
creased from 11 million square yards in 1980 to 65 million square yards
in 1982. The ratio of imports from China to apparent domestic con-
sumption increased from 2.7% in 1980 to 12.4% in 1982. This occurred
while domestic consumption declined from 543 million square yards in
1981 to 524 million square yards in 1982. 7
In August 1982 the American Textile Manufacturers Institute and
eight of its member producer companies fied a petition against the
China National Textiles Import and Export Corporation (Chinatex)
concerning exports to the United States of unbleached and uncolored
polyester/cotton printcloth fabric.74
Following the ITC's preliminary determination in September 1982
that there was reason to believe that the imports were materially injur-
ing or threatening to materially injure the United States printeloth in-
dustry, Commerce issued its preliminary determination of sales at
LTFV in March 1983.15 On the basis of its investigation of the period
March through August 1982, Commerce found that foreign market
value exceeded the United States price on all sales compared. Dump-
ing margins ranged from 20% to 30.8% and the weighted-average mar-
gin on all sales compared was placed at 23.1%.76 The final LTFV
determination, issued in July 1982, found margins ranging from 21.3%
to 29.4% and a weighted-average margin of 22.4% on all sales com-
pared.77 Commerce decided that China was a state-controlled econ-
omy for purposes of the investigation because it found that the major
raw material, cotton, had production targets and prices set or heavily
influenced by the state. In addition, Commerce found that China's tex-
tile industry had a dual pricing structure heavily influenced by the
state.78
Chinatex made several arguments in its own defense on the issue
of injury or threat of injury to the United States printcloth industry.
73. See generally USITC Pub. No. 1421, Investigation No. 731-TA-101, at 4-14 (Sept.
1983).
74. Institution of Preliminary Antidumping Investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 35,365 (1982).
75. Preliminary Determination of Sales at LTFV, 48 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1983).
76. 1d In May, the margins were amended to reflect a range of from 18.8% to 29.4%,
with a weighted-average margin on all sales placed at 21.8%. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,770 (1983).
77. 48 Fed. Reg. 34,312 (1983).
78. Id Thailand was chosen as the most appropriate surrogate. Foreign market value
was based on the prices at which the Thai producer sold printcloth to third country markets
because the producer made no sales of such or similar merchandise for consumption in the
Thai home market. Id
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Chinatex first argued that any material injury experienced by the
United States printcloth industry was due to a decline in demand
caused by the recession and high interest rates in the United States as
well as the high value of the United States dollar.79 Such domestic
economic conditions, according to Chinatex, simply could not support
the quantity of printcloth which had been ordered at the boom market
prices of 1980 (when China entered the market) and the first three
quarters of 1981. According to Chinatex, the inevitable result was
oversupply."0 United States printcloth production, however, continued
at a high rate during 1982 (only 5.3% off 1981)8 i while imports, gener-
ally and from China, fell.8 2 Domestic printcloth producers were said to
have gained market share in late 1981 and the first half of 1982.83
Second, Chinatex argued that the decline in prices resulted from
the decline in demand, not from underselling by the Chinese. This
argument included both qualitative and empirical elements. The quali-
tative argument was that Chinese sales had all been at prevailing mar-
ket prices based on a "historic and justified relationship" between
prices of printcloth from China and prices for United States domestic
goods.8" This relationship was said to derive from the fact that the
printcloth market does not function as a pure commodity market; that
is, differences in product quality and terms and conditions of sale are
reflected in differences in price. The empirical element of the argu-
ment purported to establish the independence of price movements on
the one hand and China's participation in the market on the other.8 6
Finally, Chinatex dealt specifically with the "threat of material in-
jury" issue. First, it applied the various relevant factors to the situation
at hand. On the issue of the rate of increase of exports, Chinatex sub-
mitted that imports from China had declined both absolutely and as a
percentage of the market. On the issue of China's capacity to generate
exports, Chinatex responded by pointing to a large, unsatisfied, home
market demand for textile products. On the issue of the availability of
79. Respondent's (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief at 5, USITC Investigation No,
731-TA-101 (1981).
80. Id at 5-7.
81. Id. at 8-10.
82. Id
83. Id at 11.
84. Id at 14.
85. Id at 14-15. For an excellent discussion of differences between United States and
Chinese contract practice, see Lubman, Trade Contracts and Technology Licensing, in 1983
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 28-59 (1983).
86. Respondent's (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief, supra note 79, at 19.
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other export markets, Chinatex referred to the significance of Hong
Kong, Japan and European nations as users of Chinese printcloth.s
Second, Chinatex challenged the significance of a 1979 cable from the
United States embassy in Hong Kong, upon which the allegation that
China had "targeted" textiles for export development was based.""
Third, Chinatex discussed the significance of the fact that unused quota
for printcloth remained to be filled. Initially, the existence of the quota
itself was seen as preventing any threat inasmuch as it was presumably
agreed to on the basis of all available information. Beyond this rather
literal and simplistic argument Chinatex cited the tendency of exporters
subject to quota to "trade up" from low to high value items within the
quota to support the argument that Chinese printcloth was not a threat
because other more valuable items were covered by quota. 9
In spite of these arguments the ITC found that the combined ef-
fects of both the volume and price of imports from China during the
period under investigation created significant downward pressure on
domestic market prices.90 The ITC emphasized that in 1982 imports
from China had increased at a time when imports from every other
major exporting country decreased, in most cases substantially.9t
Moreover, during the period from mid-1981 through the first quarter of
1983, printcloth from China undersold the domestic product by mar-
gins well in excess of the one-half cent margin which purchasers typi-
cally demanded.92 The ITC concluded that this downward pressure on
prices contributed to the decline in domestic industry operating income
and ratio of operating income to net sales between 1981 and 1982. In
1983 the financial experience of domestic products worsened further,
five of the seven reporting firms experienced both operating and net
losses; the other two experienced substantial declines.93 The ITC also
found that the domestic industry's poor financial performance in 1982
87. Id at 21-22.
88. The cable antedated the United States-China Textiles Agreement and the imposi-
tion of quotas, to say nothing of the continuing current controversy over terms of future
textile trade. It discussed textiles generally, with no reference to printcloth specifically. It
also described a whole host of problems in the Chinese textile industry, which would be
incompatible with achieving full realization of any targeting goals. See Id at 23.
89. Id at 24.
90. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,249 (1983); USITC Pub. No. 1421, Investigation No. 731-TA-101, at
13 (Sept. 1983).
91. USITC Pub. No. 1421, Investigation No. 731-TA-101, at 14 (1983). As a share of
total imports, imports from China increased from 31% in 1980 to 42% in 1981 and to 62% in
1982. Id
92. Id at 17.
93. Id at 10-11.
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and 1983 had affected its ability to make investments necessary to
lower costs of production, particularly labor and energy costs.94 The
imports were therefore held to be a cause of material injury being ex-
perienced by the domestic printcloth industry95 and Commerce gave
notice of assessment of antidumping duties accordingly.96
3. Cotton Shop Towels
Cotton shop towels are cloths used for wiping and cleaning in in-
dustrial and commercial establishments. They are used primarily for
wiping machine parts and cleaning away ink, grease, oil and other un-
wanted substances. The primary purchasers of cotton shop towels are
industrial laundries which rent them to industrial and commercial es-
tablishments.97 Imports for consumption from China rose from 45.5
million towels in 1980 to 94.3 million in 1981 and then declined to 83.0
million towels in 1982. A further decline occurred during the first half
of 1983 (31.0 million towels compared to 33.5 million in January-June
1982). However, the ratio of imports from China to apparent domestic
consumption increased without interruption from 18.1% in 1980 to
34.5% in 1981 to 38.3% in 1982 and to 33.3% in January-June 1983
(compared to 31.1% for the first half of 1982).98
Shortly after the printcloth proceeding was initiated, Milliken In-
dustries, Inc. of La Grange, Georgia filed a petition attacking Chinese
exports of cotton shop towels9 9 to the United States. Specifically, Milli-
ken charged that Chinese exporters were selling towels in the United
States below fair market value. The petitioners argued that such pric-
ing practices could result in material injury to a United States
industry.1°°
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id at 13. Although current injury was found, Commissioner Stem noted that the
probable effect of the July 30, 1983 textile agreement would be to eliminate threat of injury.
Id at 20-21. Under the agreement, China accepted a growth in its overall textile quotas of
between 2% and 3% a year, this is slightly higher than that accorded other Asian countries,
but far lower than the 6% annual growth China had sought. Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1983, at 37,
col. 2. For general background on United States quotas, see Weil, The Textiles Deadlock,
THE CHINA Bus. Rav. Nov.-Dec. 1982, 31. For a discussion of the related problem of
United States polyester sales to China, see Weil, The Polyester Debacle, THE CHINA BuS.
Rav. Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 38.
96. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,614 (1983).
97. USITC Pub. No. 1431, Investigation No. 731-TA-103, at 3 (Sept. 1983).
98. Id at 7-8.
99. The Chinese entities exporting shop towels were China National Textiles Import
and Export Corporation (Chinatex) and China National Arts and Crafts Import and Export
Corporation (CNART). 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (1983).
100. Institution of Preliminary Antidumping Investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,653 (1982).
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The Chinese response was similar in many respects to its defense
in the printcloth proceeding. Again, China tied the decline in demand
to the recession in the United States. China believed that the argument
might be more effective in this case due to the concentrated use of cot-
ton shop towels in industrial and commercial establishments.10 China
also submitted evidence to show that during the period under investiga-
tion imports of Chinese cotton shop towels had dropped while domestic
producers of cotton shop towels gained market share.10 2 Moreover,
China claimed that while imports from China were increasing from
1979-1981, they were merely displacing other cotton shop towel im-
ports, and that there was no indication of injury to the United States
industry during that period. 0 3 China also made an argument relating
any price differentials to quality considerations, maintaining that shop
towels produced in the United States were of a higher quality than
those imported from China.1°4
The Chinese arguments on the issue of "threat of material injury"
differed from those made in the printcloth case in only two respects.
First, China responded more precisely to the question of China's ca-
pacity to generate exports. China indicated that there were only four
factories in the country which produced cotton shop towels, and
pointed out the absence of any plans to expand capacity. 0 5 The quota
issue was also treated differently because shop towels were not re-
stricted by United States import quotas. China argued that the absence
of a quota did not constitute a threat to the United States shop towel
industry because the 1980 Textile Agreement"°6 provided that quotas
on products not already covered may be established at any time the
United States "believes that imports. . . are, due to market disruption,
threatening to impede the orderly development of trade between the
two countries." 10 7
In October 1982 the ITC made a preliminary determination that
the United States shop towel industry was threatened with material in-
jury. Its decision was based on import trends, sizeable inventories held
by importers and by United States Customs and indications that im-
porters were engaged in underselling and price suppression in order to
101. Respondent's (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief, supra note 79, at 5.
102. Id at 4-5.
103. Id at 6-7.
104. Id at 9-14.
105. Id at 16-17.
106. See Well, The Textiles Deadlock, supra note 95, at 31.
107. Respondent's (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief, supra note 79, at 18.
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remain competitive.108 Commerce's preliminary determination of
LTFV sales followed in March 1983.1o9 Commerce found that foreign
market value exceeded the United States price on all of the sales com-
pared. Dumping margins were found to range from 19.7% to 46.6%,
with a weighted-average margin of 31.4% on all sales compared. The
final LTFV determination by Commerce in August 1983 found dump-
ing margins ranging from 2.6% to 52.6%, with a weighted-average mar-
gin of 38.8% on all sales compared."t 0 Commerce concluded that
China was a state-controlled economy for purposes of the investigation
because (1) the major raw material, cotton, had production targets and
prices set or heavily influenced by the state, and (2) the textile industry
in China had a dual pricing structure which was heavily influenced by
the state."' Because Commerce was unable to secure the cooperation
of a surrogate which produced shop towels during the period of the
investigation," 2 foreign market value was based on the constructed
value of the merchandise.' '3
The ITC decided in September 1983 that imports of Chinese cot-
ton shop towels had materially injured an industry in the United
108. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,777 (1982). Although January-July 1982 imports had fallen 22%,
1981 imports were more than twice the 1980 level and more than 10 times the level of im-
ports in 1978. The ratio of Chinese imports to domestic consumption had increased from
5.4% in 1979 to 17.8% in 1980 and to 34.6% in 1981. Domestic prices during the period
under investigation rose slightly while Chinese prices declined. The ITC also relied on its
own recent report, which projected textile products to be one of the key areas of export
oriented light industry China would develop as a means of earning foreign exchange. Id at
46, 778-79.
109. Preliminary Determination of Sales at LTFV, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (1983).
110. 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (1983). These margins were later amended due to a mathemati-
cal error in the calculation of constructed value. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,614 (1983).
111. 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055, 37056 (1983).
112. Commerce regarded Pakistan as the most appropriate surrogate, but it was unable
to obtain information on Pakistani home market sales of the product. Other countries con-
sidered as surrogates were India, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Dominican Republic,
Columbia, and Hong Kong. However, Commerce was unable to obtain information on
prices or costs of manufacturing shop towels in those countries. Furthermore, many of those
countries did not produce shop towels during the period of investigation. Id
113. Constructed value was calculated in accordance with the provisions of section
353.8(c) of the Commerce regulations. First, Commerce gathered and verified information
concerning the factors of production pertinent to the production of shop towels in China,
Then it valued those factors in a non-state-controlled economy country (Indonesia) which
Commerce determined to be reasonably comparable in economic development to China,
Finally, Commerce added to these values a statutorily required amount for general expenses
and profit and the cost of all containers, coverings and other expenses as required by statute,
Id
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States.114 While the ratio of shop towel imports from China to domestic
consumption increased without interruption from 1980 to mid-1983,"15
capacity utilization in the United States shop towel industry decreased
from 42.2% in 1980 to 40.8% in 1981 to 32.8% in 1982. It further de-
clined from 40.1% in the period from January to May 1982 to 36.1% for
the comparable period in 1983.116 The quantity of United States pro-
ducers' shipments declined from about 160 million towels in 1980 and
1981 to 123.9 million towels in 1982, declining an additional 9% to 49.8
million towels during January to May 1983 compared with the same
period a year earlier.1 7 Both employees and producers suffered during
1982 and the first half of 1983.118 The ITC found the primary reason
for declining profitability to be a "drop in sales volume, which contrib-
uted to rising unit costs, coupled with selling prices which did not keep
pace with increasing unit costs and expenses."'"19
In considering the causal relationship between LTFV imports and
the alleged injury, the ITC noted that imports of cotton shop towels
from all sources, after increasing 25% from 91 million towels in 1980 to
about 114 million in 1981, decreased 18% in 1982 to 93 million towels.
Imports from January to June of 1983 were 16% higher than those in
the corresponding period of 1982, with imports from China accounting
for almost all of the increase. 2 ° All towel purchasers surveyed reported
increased purchases of imports from China during 1981 and 1982, with
Chinese towels underselling domestic towels by an average of 30% dur-
ing the period. Although domestic towels were generally regarded as
being of better quality than imported towels, purchasers felt that for
most purposes the imported towel and domestic towel both performed
satisfactorily for the user. 12 1 Thus the price differential became crucial
to purchasers. As a result of the ITC's decision, Commerce issued its
notice of assessment of antidumping duties on September 27, 1983.11
4. Mushrooms
In October 1982 the Four "H" Corporation filed an antidumping
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 45,481 (1983); USITC Pub. No. 1431, Investigation No. 731-TA-103
(Sept. 1983).
115. See supra text accompanying note 98.
116. USITC Pub. No. 1431, supra note 97, at A-9.
117. Id at A-10.
118. Id at A-12-16.
119. Id at A-16.
120. I d at A-20-21.
121. Id at A-28.
122. 48 Fed. Reg. 45,277 (1983).
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petition involving imports of canned mushrooms from China.123 This
antidumping action represented another effort by domestic farmers and
canners to protect their business. The farmers' persistent efforts to se-
cure protection may have stemmed partially from the fact that they
regarded themselves as "pawns in an attempt by the United States to
promote trade with China."' 4 Evidence indicated that the United
States mushroom industry was suffering while sales of imported Chi-
nese mushrooms remained strong. For example, the American Mush-
room Institute, a Pennsylvania-based trade organization, lost 50 of its
200 local members during 1981-82 as farmers filed for bankruptcy or
sold out.12 5 At the same time, it was reported that China's market
share of one half of the United States canned mushroom market had
held steady for 3 years.'2 6
In December 1982 the ITC determined that there was reasonable
indication that the United States canned mushroom industry was mate-
rially injured or threatened with material injury by imports of canned
mushrooms from China.' 27 A preliminary Commerce determination of
sales at LTFV followed, which found that the fair market value ex-
ceeded the United States price on 17% of sales compared, with dump-
ing margins ranging from 2.17% to 55.26% and a weighted-average
margin of 7.38% on all sales compared.' 8 Commerce found China to
be a state-controlled economy for purposes of the investigation, and
Indonesia was chosen as a surrogate.
The petitioner sought retroactive suspension of liquidations on
grounds that "critical circumstances" existed with respect to imports
from China. In order to find "critical circumstances," Commerce re-
quires two findings: (1) a history of dumping of the items in question
in the United States or elsewhere, or knowledge, or reason to know on
the importer's part, that the exporter was selling the item at LTFV; and
(2) a massive volume of imports of the item over a relatively short pe-
riod.'29 The petitioner did not allege a history of dumping but did as-
sert that importers should have known that canned mushrooms were
being sold at LTFV, because they should have known that foreign mar-
ket value would be based on the surrogate markets of either Taiwan or
123. Preliminary Antidumping Investigation No. 731-TA-115, 47 Fed. Reg, 49,103
(1982).
124. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1982, at D4, col. 1.
125. Id
126. d
127. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,336 (1982).
128. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,768 (1983).
129. Id at 22,770.
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Korea. Commerce found that neither the petitioners nor importers
could have known that Indonesia would be used as a surrogate or
which Indonesian sales (home market or export) would be used to de-
termine foreign market value. Commerce also decided that there was
no basis for believing that importers knew, or should have known, that
the Chinese exporter was selling canned mushrooms in the United
States at LTFV. Accordingly, Commerce found that "critical circum-
stances" did not exist; thus liquidations were not suspended
retroactively. 130
In addition, in September 1983 Commerce found that canned
mushrooms from China were not, nor were they likely to be, sold in the
United States at LTFV.' 31 The weighted-average margin for all sales
compared was 0.46%, an amount Commerce regarded as de minimis.'32
Foreign market value was based on the home market price of Indone-
sian canned mushrooms.1 33  Based on this decision, the investigation
ended. 134
5. Potassium Permanganate, Chloropicrin, Barium Chloride
and Barium Carbonate
Several more antidumping proceedings were initiated in 1983.
These proceedings involved: a) potassium permanganate;
b) chloropicrin; c) barium chloride and barium carbonate.
a. Potassium Permanganate
In February Carus Chemical Co., a United States chemical pro-
ducer, filed a petition involving exports of potassium permanganate
from China.' 35  Potassium permanganate is an inorganic chemical
product available in free flowing, technical and pharmaceutical
grades.1 36 It was exported by China National Chemicals Import and
130. Id
131. 48 Fed. Reg. 45,445 (1983).
132. Id
133. Id The prices used were delivered prices, with a deduction for inland freight and
adjustment for differences in credit costs. Id at 45,445-46. Commerce denied a number of
other deductions and adjustments sought by the parties. Id at 45,446-47.
134. Id at 45,447; 48 Fed. Reg. 45,623 (1983).
135. Preliminary Antidumping Investigation Nos. 731-TA-125, 126,48 Fed. Reg. 11,482
(1983).
136. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,175 (1983). It is used by various industries and municipalities as an
oxidizer. Municipalities use it primarily for water and waste-water treatment for the re-
moval of impurities and the reduction of odor. Industrial uses for potassium permanganate
include chemical manufacturing and processing, aquaculture (fish farming), metal process-
ing, air and gas purification, water treatment and waste-water treatment. In addition, potas-
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Export Corporation (SINOCHEM).' 37 In August 1983, Commerce
made a preliminary determination of sales at LTFV.138 It concluded
that China was a state-controlled economy country for purposes of the
investigation on the grounds that output quotas for purchase by the
state were set and prices were administered at least up to the quota
level. 139 To determine foreign market value, Commerce constructed a
value based on specific components or factors of production in China,
valued on the basis of prices and costs in Thailand. 4 ' On this basis
Commerce found that the foreign market value exceeded the United
States price on all sales compared, with margins ranging from 41.13%
to 47.35% and a weighted-average margin on all sales compared of
42.54%.14
1
The margins in Commerce's final determination of sales at LTFV
were slightly lower, but still quite significant. 42 The most significant
part of Commerce's final determination, however, appears to be its af-
firmative determination of critical circumstances. 43 Although Com-
merce found no history of dumping of potassium permanganate from
China, it concluded that United States importers knew or should have
known that the product was being sold in the United States at less than
its fair value.144 Commerce said that its critical circumstances determi-
nation in the mushroom case 145 "should not be interpreted so as to im-
ply that in all state-controlled economy cases, an importer could not
have or should not have known that the sales in question were at less
than fair value simply because they could not anticipate precisely how
we would determine foreign market value."' 146 Such a narrow interpre-
sium permanganate is used as a decoloring and bleaching agent in the textile and tanning
industries, as an oxidizer in the decontamination of radioactive wastes, and as an aid in
flotation processes used in mining. USITC Pub. No. 1480 (Jan. 1984), at 4-5.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id at 36,176. Commerce had first attempted to find a country which produced po-
tassium permanganate and was at an economic level comparable to that of China. It found
India to be the most appropriate surrogate, but the Indian government declined to partici-
pate in the investigation. .d at 36,175. Commerce then decided to look for a product which
was similar to Chinese potassium permanganate, but could find none. Id at 36,175-76.
141. Id at 36,175.
142. The foreign market value exceeded the United States price on 100% of sales, with
margins ranging from 36.78% to 42.24% and an overall weighted-average margin on all sales
compared of 39.63%. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,347 (1983).
143. Id at 57,348-50. There had already been a preliminary determination that critical
circumstances existed. Id at 36,176.
144. Id at 57,348-49.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
146. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,349.
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tation of the "knowledge of dumping" test, Commerce said, would pre-
clude it from ever reaching an affirmative critical circumstances
determination in instances involving no history of dumping; therefore,
Commerce felt it had to develop tests "which are not dependent upon
specific actual or implied knowledge of which country would be chosen
as a surrogate for determining fair value." 147
Applying this reasoning, Commerce found that the potassium per-
manganate industry is "a closely knit industry acutely aware of pricing
from all sources, since sources are very limited."' 48 Because Spain, a
non-state-controlled economy, was the only other principal producer of
the product exporting to the United States, "importers knew or should
have known, at least generally, what the value of the product is in mar-
ket economy countries, and thus the minimum likely fair value of the
Chinese merchandise."'149 Because the unit price of potassium perman-
ganate imported into the United States from China was 22% less than
that imported from Spain (the most likely source of a fair value stan-
dard), Commerce concluded that importers knew or should have
known that the China exports were at less than fair value. Commerce
went on to also find a massive volume of imports over a relatively short
period. 5' Thus, all elements necessary to support a finding of critical
circumstances were present, and the significance of the importers' un-
certainty over what Commerce might select as the basis for foreign
market value was limited significantly from what the mushroom case
had seemed to imply.
In January 1984 the ITC determined that an industry in the
United States was materially injured by reason of imports of potassium
permanganate from China. 51 The Commission found that material in-
jury had been demonstrated by declines in production, domestic ship-
ments, capacity utilization and profitability, as well as increased
inventories and consequent plant shutdowns during the period under
review (March through July 1983).152 Coincident with these difficul-
ties, LTFV imports from China tripled and prices of the Chinese prod-
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id
150. The factors considered were: recent import penetration levels, changes in import
penetration since the date of the ITC's preliminary affirmative determination of injury,
whether imports have surged recently, whether recent imports are significantly above the
average calculated aver the last several years (1981-83), and whether the patterns of imports
over that period may be explained by seasonal swings. Id at 57,350.
151. USITC Pub. No. 1480 (Jan. 1984), at 1.
152. Id at 3.
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uct were substantially lower than the domestic product.15 3  Price
suppression was found to exist, and lost sales data established that nu-
merous contracts had been lost by the domestic producer to imports
from China on the basis of price. 54
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the ITC's January 1984 de-
termination was its finding that massive imports over a relatively short
period of time made it necessary to impose retroactive duties in order
to prevent injury from recurring.'55 During the period between the
initiation of the investigation and Commerce's preliminary determina-
tion (March to July 1983), the amount of potassium permanganate en-
tering the United States from China was nearly four times what it had
been during the same period a year earlier.'56 Although attempts were
made to explain the surge as a lag between the time of placing orders
and receiving shipments, information developed in the investigation in-
dicated that much of the Chinese product had arrived from Europe
where it had been held in warehouses. Commissioner Eckes felt that
this evidence undercut the claim of a long supply line and suggested
that the surge was intended to avoid imposition of preliminary an-
tidumping duties. 57 Accordingly, Commerce directed the assessment
153. Id
154. Id at 3-4. The role that the petitioner itself had played in introducing potassium
permanganate from China to the United States market is interesting to contemplate. Sub-
stantial importation of the product from China in 1980 was "largely due to purchases by
Carus which were intended to insure that Carus could meet its contractual obligations to its
customers." Id at 9. In 1981, however, Cams lost its largest customer (which had switched
to a different manufacturing process that did not require the use of potassium permanga-
nate), with the result that imports from China in 1981 declined substantially. Id A compar-
ison of import volumes from China with Cams' fortunes reveals interesting relationships,
Imports from China amounted to 1 million pounds in 1980, declined to 281,000 pounds in
1981 before increasing to 588,000 pounds in 1982, and then climbing rapidly to 1.4 million
pounds during January-August 1983 (a threefold increase over the same period in 1982). Id
at 17. It would be especially interesting to compare the prices which Carus had paid for the
product from China in 1980 with the prices which Cams later challenged as being at LTFV.
155. Id at I. Commissioner Eckes pointed out that this was the first time the Commis-
sion had ever made such a determination. Id at 19. For a summary of the relevant legisla-
tive history, see id at 20.
156. The data indicated that 1,150,000 pounds entered the United States during the rele-
vant period in 1983, compared with 264,000 pounds in 1982. In April, a month after the
investigation was initiated by Commerce, 578,000 pounds entered, and more than one third
(428,000) of the total amount entered in July immediately before Commerce's preliminary
determination. Id at 21. Fully ninety-six percent of the imports from China for the first
eight months of 1983 entered during April-August, after the antidumping investigation was
instituted. Id at 10. In addition, the ratio of imports from China to apparent domestic
consumption more than doubled during the first eight months of 1983 compared with that in
the corresponding period of 1982. Id at 10.
157. Id at 21.
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of antidumping duties equal to the amount by which the foreign mar-
ket value exceeded the United States price for all uniquidated entries
of potassium permanganate entered, or withdrawn from warehouses,
for consumption 90 days before Commerce's August 9, 1983 prelimi-
nary determination of sales at LTFV.'58
b. Chloropicrin
In April 1983 two American chemical companies filed a petition
on behalf of the United States chloropicrin industry. 59 A major use of
chloropicrin (also known as trichloronitromethane) is as a pre-planting
soil fumigant.'60 SINOCHEM, once again, was the exporter.' 6' In
June 1983 the ITC found reasonable indication of material injury' 6
and in September Commerce made a preliminary determination of
sales at LTFV.163 A state-controlled economy determination was made
on the same grounds as in the potassium permanganate case.'" To
determine foreign market value, Commerce used the best information
available, which was petitioner's data on the price of chloropicrin pro-
duced and sold for consumption in Japan. 65 Only one sale to the
United States had occurred during the period under investigation. The
margin of dumping on that sale was found to be 222%.166
In February 1984 Commerce issued a final determination of sales
at LTFV, finding that the foreign market value of chloropicrin from
China exceeded the United States price on 100% of sales, with margins
ranging from 38% to 63% and an overall weighted-average margin on
all sales compared of 58%.167 Commerce added two additional reasons
158. 49 Fed. Reg. 3898 (1984).
159. Preliminary Antidumping Investigation No. 731-TA-130, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,765
(1983).
160. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,799, 41,800 (1983).
161. Id
162. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,798 (1983).
163. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,799 (1983).
164. Id at 41,800; see supra text accompanying note 139.
165. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,799 (1983). Japan and France, the only non-state-controlled econ-
omy countries other than the United States which produced cholorpicrin, were not regarded
as suitable surrorgates because they were not at a stage of economic development compara-
ble to that of China. Commerce had also attempted to construct a value based on specific
components or factors of production in China. For purposes of the preliminary determina-
tion, however, Commerce was unable to find values of those factors in a non-state-controlled
economy reasonably comparable to China. Id
166. Id Just as in the potassium permanganate case, and on similar gounds, Commerce
also preliminarily determined that critical circumstances existed. id at 41,800-801; see
supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
167. 49 Fed. Reg. 5983 (1984).
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to those it had set forth in its preliminary determination regarding the
Chinese economy as state-controlled:' (1) profits were misleading,
and (2) there was not adequate representation of the costs of produc-
tion. 69 The only non-state-controlled economy countries other than
the United States which produce chloropicrin were not at a stage of
economic development comparable to China. 70 Therefore, Commerce
constructed a foreign market value based on specific components or
factors of production in China, valued on the basis of prices and costs
in a non-state-controlled economy country reasonably comparable in
economic development to China; India was the country selected.' 7 1
Commerce's final determination of sales at LTFV also addressed
the "critical circumstances" issue.' 72 Its preliminary determination had
found critical circumstances. It had based its belief that importers
knew or should have known that the exporter was selling chloropicrin
at LTFV solely on the fact that prices of Chinese chloropicrin were 25%
less than prices for domestically produced chloropicrin. For purposes
of its preliminary determination, Commerce felt that in the absence of
United States imports from any other country, comparing Chinese and
United States prices was a reasonable basis for belief or suspicion
about knowledge of dumping. 7 3 However, in its final determination,
Commerce acknowledged the difficulty of imputing knowledge of sales
168. See supra text accompanying notes 164 and 139.
169. 49 Fed. Reg. 5983 (1984). In response to the importer's objections to the state-con-
trolled economy determination, Commerce also noted certain statements that a spokesman
for China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade had made on November 30,
1983 in conjunction with the countervailing duty investigation of textiles, apparel and re-
lated products:
The People's Republic of China is a country with a planned economy. Import and
export trade is carried out in compliance with the state plan and takes up only a
small proportion of our gross national product. . . Export commodities are
purchased at domestic prices and sold at prices prevailing on the international
market. Import goods are bought at international prices and sold at domestic
prices. There is no direct relation between the domestic and international prices of
import and export commodities. Id. at 5985.
170. There were only two such countries: Japan and France. Id. at 5983.
171. Id The petitioners argued that India was not a proper surrogate because: (1) the
Indian dye intermediates industry is state-controlled, and (2) Indian prices for dye in-
termediates were not suitable elements of a constructed value because they were depressed
by Chinese imports. On the first point, Commerce found that although there was evidence
of "a degree of government involvement" in the industry, the government did not set prices.
Furthermore, information concerning many of the factors of production which were valued
in India was obtainable from companies which were not chemical dye intermediate produ-
cers in any event. Commerce found no evidence to support the petitioners' second argu-
ment. Id at 5984-85.
172. See supra text accompanying note 129.
173. 49 Fed. Reg. 5984 (1984).
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at LTFV to importers in situations involving a product from a state-
controlled economy country. As a result, determinations of critical cir-
cumstances will have to be made "on a case-by-case basis using the
available information and drawing upon market conditions in the in-
dustry which is the subject of the investigation." 74 The most signifi-
cant factor in the chloropicrin case turned out to be the absence of
producers in countries other than China exporting the product to the
United States. Commerce reasoned as follows:
If chloropicrin were imported from third countries, importers might
be able to use the price of such imports as a fair value benchmark to
determine whether the PRC imports were sold at less than fair value.
The absence of any third country imports significantly increases an
importer's difficulty in making such a determination. 75
Based upon the facts of the investigation, Commerce determined that
the importer did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to
know, that the exporter was selling chloropicrin for export to the
United States at less than its fair value. Accordingly, critical circum-
stances did not exist and the Customs Service was directed to suspend
liquidations only with respect to chloropicrin from China entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after September 19,
1983, the date of Commerce's preliminary determination. 76
c. Barium Chloride and Barium Carbonate
The last 1983 actions, initiated in October, involved barium chlo-
ride and barium carbonate.1 77 These actions raised not only the state-
controlled economy issue for purposes of determining foreign market
value, but also allegations of critical circumstances. 78 In December
the ITC determined that there was a reasonable indication that indus-
tries in the United States were materially injured by reason of the im-
ports from China. 17 9
B. Escape Clause and Market Disruption Actions
1. Mushrooms
Escape clause and market disruption proceedings seeking to regu-
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id at 5984, 5986.
177. Preliminary Antidumping Investigation Nos. 731-TA-149-150, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,626
(1983).
178. 48 Fed. Reg. 52,494, 52,495 (1983).
179. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,449 (1983).
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late mushroom imports date back to 1973, some six years before any
significant Chinese participation in the United States market. In 1973
the ITC first reported to President Nixon the threat of serious injury to
the domestic canned mushroom industry by imports, which had
reached an aggregate of 40 million pounds the previous marketing sea-
son.180 Four years later the ITC recommended a quota limiting im-
ports to 48 million pounds. President Carter rejected this
recommendation.181 In November 1979, when yearly imports reached
86.2 million pounds, the American Mushroom Institute (AMI) re-
peated its request for relief. 182
The relief proposed was less than that which the AMI had sought
and the ITC had recommended. 83 The section 201 proceeding covered
all imports of mushrooms. Subsequently, Korea and Taiwan cut back
on their exports to the United States, but exports from China continued
to increase, eventually reaching the rate of 55 million pounds a year.18 4
Consequently, the AMI filed a new petition in June 1982, seeking a
section 406 investigation and the imposition of quotas on imports of
Chinese mushrooms. 185
The China National Cereals and Oils Import and Export Corpora-
tion (CEROILS) and the United States importers of Chinese mush-
rooms vigorously resisted the section 406 proceeding. First, they
argued that any injury had already been remedied by the import relief
already in effect.' 86 Second, they pointed out that both total imports
180. Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 21.
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id at 22.
Faced with figures that showed foreign mushrooms accounting for 56 percent of
the 1979/80 U.S. consumption rate of 114 million pounds-and facing an uphill
election battle with the business sector-[Carter] decided to levy thrce-year import
duties on prepared and preserved mushrooms, effective November 1, 1980. The
levels: first year: 3.21 plus 30 percent ad valorum (of the value); second year: 3.2¢
plus 25 percent ad valorum; third year: 3.2¢ plus 20 percent ad valorum.
Id The ITC had recommended 3-year quotas starting at 86 million pounds and winding up
at 103 million pounds in the final year, 1982/83.
184. Richards, supra note 4, at 31; N.Y. Times, supra note 124 at D4, col. I.
185. Richards, supra note 4, at 31.
186. Brief of Nature's Farm Products, USITC Investigation No. 406-TA-9, at 17-19
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Nature's Farm Products]. Nature's Farm Products
claimed that the AMrs attempt to seek section 406 relief when section 201 relief was already
in effect constituted a case of first impression. In testimony before the ITC, Christopher
Phillips, President of the National Council for United States-China Trade, urged:
Until this extraordinary tariff protection already afforded the U.S. mushroom in-
dustry expires at the end of 1983, this entire proceeding would appear to be prema-
ture. For the ITC to recommend additional quantitative relief when this high tariff
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from all countries and the share of United States consumption captured
by imports from China had been declining since 1980. ta7 China also
argued that its exports to the United States could not be regarded as
"rapidly increasing" because the rate of increase had slowed by
1982,18 and the ratio of imports from China to total imports had re-
mained almost constant from 1981 to the first half of 1982.'19 Third,
China argued that any new injury was attributable to factors other than
imports from China. Possible factors suggested included the changing
status of the domestic industry, the growing role of the fresh mushroom
market, the price/sales impact of the 1980 import relief itself, the reces-
sion, botulism scares, and the domestic industry's raw material costs. 90
Finally, China submitted that further relief would be ineffective, ineffi-
cient, and would delay rather than promote adjustment in the
industry. 191
The ITC vote was split two to two with the commissioners who
voted to limit Chinese imports recommending quotas of 21 million
pounds a year for three years. 192 President Reagan denied the quo-
tas.193 Consequently, the antidumping proceeding was soon initiated.
protection is already costing U.S. consumers dearly, would, in our view, be a most
unfortunate precedent.
Richards, supra note 4, at 30.
187. Brief of Nature's Farm Products, USITC Investigation No. 406-TA-9, at 20-22. To-
tal imports were 117.3 million pounds in 1980, 88.6 million pounds in 1981, and 33 million
pounds for the first six months of 1982. The share of consumption captured by imports was
50.8% in 1980 and 45.4% in 1981.
188. Id at 28-29. The rate of increase from 1980 to 1981 was 101%, but the rate of
increase from the first half of 1981 to the first half of 1982 was only 10.5%. Id When'
considering rates of increase it should be kept in mind that in December 1979 Chinese
mushrooms occupied only .97% of the United States import market. Goldsmith, .rupra note
58, at 22.
189. Brief of Nature's Farm Products, USITC Investigation No. 406-TA-9, at 30-31.
These figures were 31.2% for 1981 and 31.6% for the first half of 1982.
190. Id at 32-70; see also Prehearing Brief of CEROILS, USITC Investigation No. 406-
TA-9 (1982).
191. Brief of Nature's Farm Products, USITC Investigation No. 406-TA-9, at 75-80.
192. N.Y. Times, supra note 124.
193. Id The factors for the President to consider under the statute arc: (1) probable
effectiveness of import relief as a means of promoting adjustment, the efforts being made or
to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to import competition, and other
considerations relative to the position of the industry on the nation's economy; (2) effect of
import relief on consumers and on competition; (3) effect of import relief on the interna-
tional economic interests of the United States; (4) impact of possible retaliatory restrictions
by foreign governments; and (5) economic and social costs which would be incurred by
taxpayers, communities, and workers if import relief were or were not provided. See Cun-
ningham, supra note 36, at 179.
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In addition, the AMI called for an orderly marketing arrangement.194
An ITC investigation was commenced in April 1983 to advise President
Reagan on the probable economic effect that termination of import re-
lief would have on the domestic industry. That investigation, however,
was terminated in June 1983 on the domestic producers' own
motion.195
2. Ceramic Tableware
In May 1982 the American Dinnerware Emergency Committee
(ADEC) petitioned the ITC seeking relief, in the form of quotas, from
market disruption allegedly caused by the import of certain household
porcelain table and kitchen articles from China. 196 ADEC alleged that
porcelain dinnerware from China was interchangeable with American-
made earthenware and should be considered a directly competitive
product. ADEC also noted that imports of porcelain dinnerware from
China had increased sharply between 1979 and 1982 and that the im-
ports had severely hurt the domestic earthenware industry. 197
Importers of Chinese porcelainware and the China National Arts
and Crafts Import and Export Corporation (ARTCHINA) cooperated
in responding to the petition.99 Their response was summarized in the
conclusions of a report filed on their behalf by the Ceramic Importers
Association of America. This report concluded that: (1) earthenware
imports from China constituted only 1% of domestic earthenware sales;
(2) in 1981, domestic producers' earthenware sales declined sharply,
while earthenware imports from non-Chinese sources increased
sharply; (3) retailers had directed chinaware toward a market segment
separate and distinct from that served by earthenware; (4) sales of
Corelle products (an opaque, tempered glass product made by Corn-
ing) had significantly affected earthenware sales; (5) recent growth in
sales of chinaware from China represented a shift in sourcing from
Japanese to Chinese producers; (6) domestic earthenware producers
failed to market attractive dinnerware patterns; and (7) limiting china-
ware imports from China would not benefit domestic earthenware
producers.' 99
194. N.Y. Times, supra note 124, at D4, col. 4; see supra note 45.
195. USITC Investigation No. 203-TA-14, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,373 (1983).
196. Richards, supra note 4, at 29. The American Dinnerware Emergency Committee
represented 7 United States earthenware manufacturers. See statement of John G. Reilly of
ICF, Inc., July 19, 1982, USITC Investigation No. 406-TA-8 (1982).
197. Richards, supra note 4, at 29.
198. Id
199. Statement of John G. Reilly of ICF, Inc., supra note 196.
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The ITC decided in favor of the importers. It has been suggested
that a key element contributing to the decision was the importers' focus
on countering the domestic manufacturers' assertion that Chinese por-
celain was "like or directly competitive" with United States prod-
ucts.2co If the ITC narrowly defines an industry, it follows that it will
be easier for importers to prevail because the more narrowly the cate-
gories of "directly competitive" goods are defined, the less likely it is
that the categories will overlap.20 1
3. Gloves and Clothespins
Two earlier cases, decided in 1978, involved gloves and clothes-
pins. Relief (in the form of quotas) 20 2 was granted in the clothespins
case on grounds of lost sales by domestic producers, rising market pen-
etration, substantial underselling, and adverse trends in United States
production, shipments, capacity utilization, employment and profits.20 3
Although the ITC split on whether relief should be granted in the
gloves case, a majority decided it should not be based on stable or im-
proving trends in operating results of United States producers.' The
Commissioners favoring relief, on the other hand, focused on the in-
creasing market share of China's glove imports, the vulnerable nature
of the United States industry as a labor-intensive business, and the fact
that Chinese imports were not controlled by the Multi-Fibre
Agreement.20 5
I. THE ISSUES
The cases discussed above may represent only the "tip of the ice-
berg" of proceedings that may be initiated against Chinese exportors.
Although many aspects of each case are peculiar to the particular prod-
ucts and industries involved, together these cases offer some general
lessons regarding such proceedings. For example, it is important to de-
fine the product and industry involved. The more narrowly they are
defined, the easier it will be for importers to distinguish the product
200. Richards, sufpra note 4, at 29. The law requires the ITC to conduct a five part analy-
sis: (1) what is the affected United States industry, (2) are imports increasing, (3) is there
"serious injury," (4) is there a "threat" of serious injury, and (5) are the imports a "substan-
tial cause" of the injury of threat. See Cunningham, suwpra note 36, at 167.
201. Richards, sulpra note 4, at 29.
202. The ITC denied other forms of relief sought. See USITC Pub. No. 902, Investiga-
tion Nos. 406-TA-2, 406-TA-3 and 406-TA-4 (Aug. 1978).
203. Id
204. See USITC Pub. No. 867 (Mar. 1978).
205. Id
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with which they are dealing from the product of a domestic manufac-
turer/petitioner. The considerable emphasis on these definitions in the
ceramic tableware and mushroom cases, in particular, should be
noted.20 6 Also, "when arguing an ITC case, accurate statistical infor-
mation and perceptive analysis lend weight and authority to any posi-
tion."20 7 In the ceramic dinnerware case, for example, the respondents
made effective use of a consulting firm to prepare and analyze relevant
trade statistics and to conduct a survey of dinnerware retailers. The
domestic manufacturers, on the other hand, submitted a single chart
with no detailed analysis.208
A. The State-Controlled Economy Issue
In antidumping actions the LTFV determination requires a com-
parison of foreign market values to prices of sales to the United States.
If the product originates in a country whose economy is "state-con-
trolled," the determination of "foreign market value" for purposes of
comparison to the United States price is "highly problematic. ' 20 9 This
difficulty results because when a state-controlled economy (SCE) is in-
volved, various alternative formulas are substituted for the producer's
"home market" price. Present United States law and regulation on this
point2 10 establish a four part hierarchy of values to be used in comput-
ing foreign market value in the event that an SCE is involved. The
preferred substitute for "home market" price is constructed value in a
non-SCE country which produces similar merchandise and which is at
a comparable stage of economic development. The next alternative is
constructed value in a non-SCE country which produces similar mer-
chandise but which does not have a comparable economy. If no non-
SCE country of comparable economic development produces similar
merchandise, petitioner may substitute "home market" price with a
constructed value determined by costs, in the SCE, of specific objective
components or factors of production. 21 ' As a last resort, United States
price or constructed value of such or similar merchandise may be
206. See Richards, supra note 4, at 29; Respondent's Brief in USITC Investigation No.
406-TA-9 (1982).
207. Richards, supra note 4, at 31.
208. Id at 29, 31.
209. See Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 62, at 280.
210. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.0-353.23 (1983). For an excellent discussion of the evolution of
special SCE provisions in United States antidumping law, see Cuneo & Manuel, supra note
62, at 28-95.
211. See supra note 17; Barden, supra note 13, at 22-25; supra notes 113 and 140 and
accompanying text.
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considered.212
The relevant governing statute21 3 fails to resolve whether "the SCE
issue [should] be determined by examining the impact of state influence
on the particular sector of the exporting country's economy in which
the merchandise is produced and sold, or... [whether] . . . Com-
merce [should] make a more general determination of state control in
the economy as a whole." 214 In the menthol case the petitioner argued
that an SCE determination is required whenever the economy of the
exporting country is generally state controlled.215 A number of Chinese
constitutional provisions support this general state control argument.23 6
CNEC utilized the more narrow approach and focused on the impact
of state influence on the domestic menthol market. CNEC argued that
the Chinese home market in menthol was not subject to state control,
therefore sales of menthol in China did not permit a precise determina-
tion of foreign market value.2 17
212. Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 62, at 294-95.
213. Under the SCE statute, Commerce is authorized to make an SCE determination if
"available information indicates to the administering authority that the economy of the
country from which the merchandise is exported is State-controlled to an extent that sales or
offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in that country or to countries other than the
United States do not permit a determination of foreign market value." 19 U.S.C. § 1676(c)
(Supp. I1 1979).
214. Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 62, at 298.
215. 46 Fed. Reg. 3259 (1981); see Petitioner's Opposition to Respondents Memoran-
dum in Support of the Use of Chinese Home Market Prices of Menthol at 1-15, USITC
Investigation No. 731-TA-28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Opposition].
216. See, ag. P.R.C. CONST. (1982) art. 1: "[T]he socialist system is the basic system of
the People's Republic of China. . . ." Article 7 defines the "state economy" as "the leading
force in the national economy." Article 11 limits the role of the "individual economy of
urban and rural working people" to that of a "complement to the socialist public economy."
The petitioner in the menthol case quoted extensively from the 1978 Constitution and other
general sources describing China's economy as "characterized by centralized planning, ad-
ministration and controL" See Petitioner's Opposition, supra note 215, at 15-26.
217. This argument was based on the following facts, derived from statements of CNEC,
Hong Jun-Yan, professor of economics at Peking University, and Carl Riskin, professor of
economics at Queens College and Columbia University, New York: (1) the Chinese govern-
ment does not own any menthol-producing concerns or facilities; (2) most of the producers
in the principal production regions in China are collectives or communes; (3) there are no
price controls, production quotas, export quotas, or incentives applicable to menthol; (4) the
producers operate in a market environment where prices and quantities are freely negoti-
ated (5) supply and demand are the predominant factors in pricing decisions; (6) the pro-
duction inputs of menthol are equally subject to market factors, without governmental
control; (7) because CNEC competes on an equal footing with other buyers of menthol in
the Chinese home market, the price of menthol on the world market has an influence on
China's home market prices; and (8) state influence in other areas of the Chinese economy
has little discernible impact in the menthol industry. Respondent's Memorandum in Sup-
port of the Use of Chinese Home Market Prices of Menthol at 6-8, USITC Investigation No.
731-TA-28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Memorandum].
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Commerce found that purchases and sales of menthol in the PRC
were essentially based upon market considerations. 1 8 Commerce also
decided, however, that the primary components in the production of
menthol-land and labor-were not bought and sold in a genuine mar-
ket and that the "pervasiveness of state planning and control of major
agricultural products. . . distorts the incentives that would be devel-
oped by a freely operating market."219 On that basis Commerce made
an affirmative SCE decision. 2 Of special significance for future pro-
ceedings, however, was Commerce's acknowledgment that CNEC had
"raised arguments which would have to be given very careful consider-
ation where different conclusions would have resulted depending upon
the approach taken." ''
Commerce has also made affirmative SCE determinations in the
printcloth 222 and shop towel223 cases. In those cases Commerce found
that cotton, the major raw material in printcloth and shop towels, had
production targets and prices that were set or heavily influenced by the
state and that the textile industry had a dual pricing structure that was
heavily influenced by the state. 2 4 The SCE determination in the
mushroom case was an especially important one. The underlying facts
in that proceeding seem to bring it closer to the menthol situation than
to the printcloth or shop towel situation because the product was sub-
ject to less direct state control. Moreover, CEROILS had the benefit of
additional experience with the responsibility system in agriculture 2 5
which it could use to bolster its appeal for non-SCE treatment.
Given the importance of the SCE determination in every case in-
volving China, the development of this issue warrants continuing
attention.226
B. Rate of Increase in Imports from China
Imports from China increased substantially during the 1979-81 pe-
218. 46 Fed. Reg. 3259 (1981).
219. Id
220. Id at 3260. Commerce expressly stated that it was not deciding the issue of statu-
tory interpretation described above because its conclusion "would be the same under either
petitioner's or'respondent's interpretation of the statute." Id at 3259.
221. Id at 3259.
222. 48 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 78.
223. 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 111.
224. Id
225. See e.g., Smith, Returning Incentives to the Farmer, THE CHINA Bus, REV. Nov.-
Dec. 1982, at 16.
226. Recent developments on the "critical circumstances" issue are also closely related to
the SCE determination. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30, 143-50, and 172-76.
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riod following the normalization of relations between the United States
and China and granting of most-favored-nation status to China in
1980.7 As the cases discussed above reflect, however, the initial surge
leveled off during 1982.228 The decrease in imports warrants continued
observation, especially in relation to the effect of anticipated economic
recovery on import levels. One can reasonably anticipate, however,
that rates of increase of the magnitude seen in 1979-1981 will become
even more unlikely as absolute levels of imports continue to in-
crease. 2 9 Quick jumps in import levels of particular products, how-
ever, are and will continue to be significant, particularly with respect to
the imposition of retroactive duties.230
C. Role of China's "Internal Settlement Rate"' '
In the menthol case, CNEC addressed the currency exchange is-
sue. This issue is of considerable importance because many countries
with state-controlled economies establish artificial currency exchange
rates which may, in conversion to dollars, overstate the value of the
item in question.232 In the menthol case CNEC denied that China arti-
ficially fixed the exchange rates of its currency; rather, it claimed that
the rate was changed regularly in response to other currencies. 33
Moreover, CNEC denied that China used multiple exchange rates2 4 to
subsidize domestic producers." 5 Huang Wenjun, of the Ministry of
227. Clarke, supra note 3, at 24.
228. Id
229. Although economic analysis should always take absolute levels of imports into ac-
count when assessing the significance of an increase in the rate ofimports, petitioners should
not overlook the value of being able to show that China exported more than ten times as
many shop towels to the United States in 1981 as in 1978.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
231. Commentators have observed that an internal settlement rate is used for foreign-
exchange transactions in China: "When a Chinese enterprise exports, the exchange rate
used between the Bank of China and the enterprise is not the official exchange rate, but the
exchange rate plus an internal settlement rate. In 1981 the net internal rate was Rmb 2.8:US
$1." Delfs, Dumping Charges Denied, CHINA TRADE RFP. Nov. 1982, at 4.
232. See Respondent's Memorandum, supra note 217, at 13.
233. Id at 14.
234. Id at 17; see also Hearing Transcript, supra note 70, at 140.
235. CNEC argued that China's currency exchange rate was "not established for political
and social purposes without regard for international monetary conditions." Respondents
Memorandum, supra note 217, at 15. However, commentators have construed the internal
settlement rate as a subsidy, "since it has the effect of making exports cheaper and imports
more expensive than if both were transacted at the official exchange rate." Dells, supra note
231, at 4-5. Wei Yuming, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, was
quoted as having acknowledged during an interview in 1981 that the internal settlement rate
was designed to subsidize exports. Id at 5.
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Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, claimed that China's current
exchange rate was "neither an internal exchange rate nor a subsidy." '236
Huang's assertion, however, does not sufficiently dispel doubts.
D. Interpretation of Information
Lack of knowledge about China may cause United States petition-
ers to make misleading allegations in trade regulation proceedings.
For example, in the menthol case the petitioner's counsel inaccurately
stated that peppermint cultivation "had expanded enormously to in-
clude an area that now covers five provinces." '237 CNEC successfully
challenged this statement, claiming that it was an unfair attempt to cre-
ate a vision of "some peril from across the Pacific" with a "monolithic
government planning vast menthol production without regard for prof-
itability."238 In fact, CNEC argued, peppermint plant/menthol pro-
duction was not listed in any state plan and was likely to be reduced
because increasing supply made it less profitable.239
Chinese entities should make sure they can respond to overgener-
alizations and misinterpretations with accurate facts and correct analy-
sis. A knowledgable commentator has observed that "the Chinese are
taking [antidumping] investigations seriously, '240 so compilation of the
statistics necessary to counter petitions should be forthcoming.
E. Transshipment/Processing
In the section 406 proceeding involving mushrooms, 241 CEROILS
argued that imports from Hong Kong and Macao should not be aggre-
gated with imports from China even though the former had been
grown in China. CEROILS contended that Hong Kong and Macao
were not mere conduits for mushroom imports from China. The con-
tention was based on a United States Commission of Customs opinion
confirming that mushrooms processed in Hong Kong and Macao un-
derwent a "substantial transformation," which was sufficient for Cus-
toms Service purposes to render Hong Kong and Macao their point of
origin.24 2 The transshipment issue must be considered in any case in-
236. Delfs, supra note 231, at 5.
237. See Hearing Transcript, surpa note 70, at 108.
238. Id at 128-30.
239. Id
240. Richards, supra note 4, at 29.
241. See generally Brief of Nature's Farm Products, supra note 186.
242. Id at 27.
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volving goods from China which are shipped through and/or processed
elsewhere before reaching their ultimate destination.
F. Price Variations Based on Quality
In both the printcloth2 43 and shop towel'" cases, Chinatex argued
that differences in price between the Chinese product and the domestic
product could be accounted for by differences in product quality.
While such an argument is available when dealing with goods other
than those subject to commodity market pricing,24 5 it has its problems
when applied to other goods. First, the comparison in antidumping
cases is made between foreign market value and United States sales
price, not between China's United States sales price and the price of its
domestic competitors' products. Second, marketing personnel may be
unwilling to emphasize the product's lower quality merely to justify the
price charged. China, a recent entrant into many markets, might find
this defense incompatible with the positive image it seeks to project.
G. Trade Control Decentralization
Although to date no trade regulation proceeding has been initiated
with respect to Chinese exports of tungsten, there are indications that
one may be forthcoming.2' One commentator has reported that
"many of the contracts for [tungsten] imports were signed, for the first
time, by provincial agencies and newly formed foreign trade corpora-
tions unleashed by decentralization." 7
Although decentralization has been regarded as leading to "some
successes in increasing China's flexibility in international transac-
tions,"2 48 it has also created a number of problems for the tungsten
trade.2 49 Accordingly, a number of more recent changes have at-
tempted to recentralize control.250 The degree to which trade regula-
243. Respondents (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief, supra note 79, at 14-15.
244. Respondent's (Preliminary) Post Conference Brief, supra note 101, at 11-14.
245. Goods subject to commodity market pricing are those whose prices are determined
by the market, rather than by the seller.
246. Brady, Getting Tough on Tungsten, THE CHINA Bus. Rnv., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 38.
247. Id For a discussion of the decentralization of China's trade organizations, see
Lubman, supra note 85, at 16-22.
248. Lubman, supra note 85 at 23.
249. "The problems most apparent to foreigners include competition, confusion, lack of
coordination, and lack of resources." Id For further discussion of each of these factors, see
id at 23-27.
250. Id at 22. For a good general description of the development of the structure of
China's foreign trade prior to 1979, see id at 13-22. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1984, at
27, col. 1.
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tion proceedings may result from the disruption of traditional Chinese
export patterns induced by trade control decentralization remains to be
seen. To the extent that decentralization facilitated sudden surges in
exports of particular products, decentralization might have been a sig-
nificant factor which motivated United States competitors to initiate
actions against Chinese exporters. 251
H. Countertrade 252
Countertrade has played a significant role in the developing trade
relations between the United States and China.25 3 Countertrade ar-
rangements may have the hidden benefit of somehow avoiding scrutiny
under United States trade law. There is, however, no basis for such a
conclusion. Indeed, although none of the proceedings described above
with respect to China have involved countertrade arrangements, Occi-
dental's twenty-year countertrade arrangement with the Soviet Union
for products including anhydrous ammonia became the target of a sec-
tion 406 proceeding.254 There is no reason to believe Commerce can-
not, or will not, find ways to assign values for purposes of the LTFV
calculation in antidumping proceedings where countertrade is
involved.
I. United States Raw Material Inputs
In 1981 and 1982 polyester yarn and cotton ranked among the top
four United States exports to China in value. 255 Assuming that some of
these materials were incorporated into the printcloth which became the
subject of the antidumping proceeding, there might be some basis for
Chinatex to argue that the benefit to the United States economy of its
purchases of materials which became incorporated in the printcloth
should be taken into consideration in the proceedings. Although this
argument may have some appeal from the standpoint of an economic
251. See 26 Percent Under Quotas, THE CHINA Bus. REV,, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 4.
252. Countertrade occurs when a supplier takes back goods in payment or partial
payment for sales. For example, a supplier of technology, services, or equipment may
contract for an agreed-upon amount of Chinese products as payment. If the sellers good is a
component in the Chinese product, the arrangement is referred to as a "compensation
transaction." If the Chinese products have no relationship to what the seller has supplied,
the arrangement is called a "counterpurchase transaction." See Goldsmith, The Uncertain
Winds of Countertrade, THE CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 30; Countertrade, Itc.,
THE CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 48.
253. Id
254. See Report to the President on Investigation No. 406-TA-5, USITC Pub. No. 1006
(Oct. 1979).
255. Strodes, U.S. 4ssesses Trade Flows, CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1982, at 7. The other
two were wheat and soybeans.
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efficiency analysis, it is not supported by any provisions in the an-
tidumping law. In any event, the attractiveness of this argument was
dampened when China discontinued purchases of cotton and synthetic
fibers from the United States in late 1982.56
J. Quotas as Preferred Remedy
Petitioners are likely to ask for a quota rather than a tariff as the
preferred remedy, because "China's exports are often priced so low that
they discourage tariffs, since they remain competitive even after tariffs
have been imposed. For important exports, the Chinese may even
lower their price enough to negate the effect of a tariff."'2 7 Any conclu-
sions about trends in this area based on cases decided so far would be
premature. Quotas were imposed on imports of wooden clothespins,258
and the United States imposed unilateral curbs freezing textile imports
at previous levels following the failure of the United States and China
to reach a new textiles agreement5 9 In the mushroom case, however,
quotas were rejected in the section 406 proceeding after duties had
been imposed previously in the section 201 proceeding.2"
K. Current Political and Economic Atmosphere
United States-China trade relations and the underlying economic
situation cannot be ignored in antidumping and related proceedings.
In the section 406 proceeding involving mushrooms, Christopher Phil-
lips, President of the National Council for United States-China Trade
testified:
We must look at this investigation in the broader context of our bilat-
eral trade relationship with the People's Republic of China.
If the PRC is to continue buying large quantities of American prod-
ucts, there is a clear need for Chinese products to have fair access to
the U.S. market to earn the foreign exchange necessary to finance
imports.261
While Phillips' testimony emphasized that the bulk of the 1981
surplus could be attributed to United States agricultural exports to
256. Weil, The Polyester Debacle, supra note 95, at 38; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1983, at DI 1,
col 2.
257. Richards, supra note 4, at 29.
258. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
259. N.Y. Times, supra note 256.
260. See supra text accompanying note 193.
261. Richards, surpa note 4, at 30.
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China,26 2 in 1982 agricultural exports to China declined in all catego-
ries except corn. This decrease was due largely to several record Chi-
nese harvests.263 Disagreements over the volume of Chinese textile
sales to the United States posed additional problems for agricultural
exports to China during 1983.2 4 Even more significant in terms of
Phillips' argument was the shifting trend in over-all trade figures. The
value of United States exports to China declined 19% in 1982 to $2.9
billion, while Chinese exports to the United States rose 20.5% to $2.3
billion.26 5 Although China continued to run a deficit in trade with the
United States, the deficit was reduced to $628.4 million in 1982; 63%
less than 1981's $1.7 billion deficit.266 In 1983 the United States sold
$2.17 billion in goods to China and ended the year with a trade deficit
of about $70 million, the first since 1977 and the fourth since trade with
China resumed in 1971. Chinese exports to the United States during
1983 fell 2% to 2.24 billion.2 67
The National Council for United States-China Trade has sug-
gested that with many bilateral issues already resolved and remaining
irritants reduced to "manageable" proportions, 1984 United States-
China trade will bounce back between 25% and 35% from 1983's de-
pressed level.268 The Council has also projected a return to a favorable
United States balance in trade between the two countries, 269 with
China stepping up its purchases of American technology and resuming
purchases of farm products at previous volumes.270 According to com-
262. Id
263. N.Y. Times, supra note 256. The United States Department of Agriculture's prcdic-
tion was for another round of bumper crops (except for rice) in China in 1983, Exports of
United States commodities to China were expected to decline to less than $800 million in the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, down from $1.8 billion in 1981-1982. Chicago Trib-
une, Aug. 23, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
264. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23, 1983, at 3, col. 1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1984, at D3, col.
1. U.S. agricultural exports for 1983 were $544 million, down 64% from 1982, despite $95
million in wheat exports during December. Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 25, col. 3.
265. N.Y. Times, supra note 225, at col. 1.
266. Id
267. Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1984 at 25, col. 3.
268. Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 22, col. 3.
269. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1984, at A6, col. I; see also Stuermer, The Way .head, I I
CHINA Bus. R. 34, 37 (1984).
270. Wal St. J., supra note 268. This prediction corresponds to the World Bank's fore-
cast of rapid growth in Chinese imports of production equipment for the rest of this decade
and a corresponding increase in U.S. export opportunities. Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 33,
col. 2; see also Lewis, China Plans to Spend One Billion on Technology from West, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 1. Charles Freeman, deputy chief of mission at the United
States embassy in Beijing, has projected U.S. exports to China for 1984 of between $2.7
billion and $3.7 billion; he said the higher figure would be reached only "if there is a spurt in
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mentators, the relationship between the two countries leading up to
Premier Zhao Zi-yang's January visit seems to lend credence to such
rosy predictions.27" ' However, it is conceivable that a projected record
1983 Chinese grain harvest272 could have a dampening effect on Chi-
nese imports of United States agricultural products. Moreover, Presi-
dent Reagan's move to tighten textile import restraints on December
16, 1983,273 raises the possibility that United States-China relations
may be jeopardized in spite of the new bilateral textile agreement com-
pleted in July 1983. Thus, significant hurdles exist which could under-
mine the efficacy of Christopher Phillips' arguments in the mushroom
case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the history of United States trade regulation proceedings
involving imports from China is brief, there is enough precedent to
provide some emerging trends and issues. As more proceedings are
filed and brought to conclusion, some of the issues discussed will con-
tinue to be salient.
Given the results in the menthol and mushroom cases, it appears
China's purchases of American electronics, energy and transportation products," and "if
China honors its grain purchase commitments." Wall St. J, Mar. 2, 1984, at 24, col 4. Pro-
jecting Chinese exports to the United States for 1984 at about S2.2 billion (unchanged from
1983), he added that China's prospects for exporting to the United States would remain
limited unless it diversifies away from textiles. Id
271. See, ag. , Farnsworth, U.. to Sign 4ccord with Peking For Closer Industrial Cooper-
ation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1984, at Al, coL 3; Bennett, Visit to U.S. by China's Premier Zhao
Indicates Change in Attitude on Reagan, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 22, col. 1; Ignatius &
Bennett, Sino-U.S. Rapprochment, 5 Years Old, Reaches Stage of Stabilig
, 
and Routine. Wall
St. J., Jan. 13, 1984, at 26, coL 5.
272. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1984, at D2, coL 4.
273. Exec. Order no. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982);see Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1983, at 2, col.
3; Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 1, coL 6. The International Trade Administration's Textile
Advisory Committees are continuing to review import trends, implementation of textile
agreements, and conditions in the domestic market. 48 Fed. Reg. 54,260 (1983), 49 Fed.
Reg. 5645 (1984). For its part, China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
issued a statement which was very critical of the Commerce Department's acceptance of a
case seeking counterveiling duties on Chinese textile exports to the United States. CHINA
TRADE NEws, Jan. 1983, at 1-2; see 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1983). The statement concluded:
China and the United States have different social and economic systems. The
United States cannot judge China's exchange prices and settlement by the criteria
of capitalist countries in general. We hope the U.S. Government will keep in mind
the broad spectrum of economic and trade relations between the two countries, and
handle the matter carefully and properly so that these relations will not be
jeopardized.
Commerce terminated the countervailing duty investigation in December 1983, however,
upon the petitioners' request. 48 Fed. Reg. 55,492 (1983).
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unlikely that China will ever avoid being classed as a state-controlled
economy. Congressman Gibbons' sponsorship of a bill that would
make it easier for domestic producers to block imports from nonmarket
economies that subsidize "targeted" exports274 indicates continuing
problems for China's use of any sort of "internal settlement rate."275
To the extent that China's exports are priced so low as to remain com-
petitive even after tariffs have been imposed, it is likely that quotas will
be the most frequently sought remedy. The political and economic at-
mosphere within each country at any given time will, of course, con-
tinue to influence the general environment within which the trade
relationship must operate.
Some of the issues discussed in this Article may become less im-
portant as time goes by. For example, with respect to those products
which China has already begun to market in the United States, the rate
of increase in exports should diminish as absolute levels of exports be-
come more substantial.276 The information gap should become a less
serious problem as the trade relationship develops.277 As the Chinese
trade control structure becomes more regularized internally, there
should be fewer drastic jumps in exports of particular products based
on disruption of traditional export patterns resulting from bureaucratic
change.
The best advice that can be given to Chinese exporters is that they
should "do their homework." They should make sure that they know
and understand the nature of the particular market in the United States
with whici they will be dealing. They should thoroughly familiarize
themselves with pricing and competitive trends in particular markets
before entering them. To the fullest extent possible, they should try to
gauge the condition of United States producers with which they will be
competing and the effect that the introduction of Chinese goods will
have on them.
274. Fresh Troublesfor Free Trade, FORTUNE, Jan. 23, 1984, at 36.
275. In explaining why the Chinese are especially vulnerable to nontariff barriers, N.T,
Wang has noted that "because of the state trading system in China, critics often maintain
that China can export without reference to actual cost." N.T. WANG, CHINA'S MODERNIZA-
TION AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 99 (1984). This fact, combined with the fact that
"the Chinese market can be closed to foreign competition through state control," raises
questions about what exactly is "fair competition." Id
276. When Chinese exports are relative newcomers to a foreign market, their success in
penetrating that market will probably appear most alarming. See Id.
277. Although the Chinese have been characterized as "unfamiliar with nontariff barri-
ers and even less experienced in overcoming them," id, their involvement in the proceedings
which have already been filed should add to their store of knowledge in this area and help
them to anticipate problems better in the future.
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Much will depend on China's appreciation of, and attention to, the
intricacies of United States trade regulation law.278 Given the fact that
in 1982, 25.9% of all Chinese products by value imported into the
United States were under quota and given the long list of products on
which proceedings appear imminent,2 7 9 it appears that China's contin-
ued attention to United States trade regulation law will be a matter of
necessity.
278. It has been suggested that "[s]ince the normalization of U.S. trade with China and
the liberalization of controls on exports to that country, there has been considerable support
for further reductions in trade controls." JoIr EcoNoMtc CoMMrrE, 97mT CoNe., 2D
SESS., CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS 16 (Comm. Print 1982). Even though
some of the most pressing problems for United States-China trade have recently been re-
solved, it would probably not be reasonable to anticipate significant further relaxation of
controls which would involve legislative action in the immediate future.
279. THE CHINA Bus. REv., .upra note 251, at 4.
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